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Guilt by Association in United States
Products Liability Cases: Are the
European Community and Japan
Likely to Develop Similar Causein-Fact Approaches to Defendant
Identification?
LUCILLE
I.

M. PONTE*

INTRODUCTION

The United States has been bedeviled by its inability to bring predictability and accountability to the products liability arena. Since
the early 1970s, the number of products liability lawsuits filed in the
United States has increased dramatically,' along with a continuing
proliferation of nontraditional liability theories. Unlike other nations,
the United States relies heavily on court determinations and jury
awards to fashion protective remedies for injured plaintiffs and to deter manufacturers from marketing defective products. 2 The United
* Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College; B.A. University of Massachusetts at
Boston, 1980; J.D. New England School of Law, 1983.
1. Between 1974 and 1986, the number of products liability lawsuits filed in the federal
courts increased 861% from 1579 in 1974 to 13,595 in 1986. George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 187 (Robert E.

Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). However, since 1974 the proportion of products liability
trials and trial awards has decreased. Manufacturers possess strong incentives to settle lawsuits to avoid the broader, negative impact of adverse court judgments. Id. at 188-90. However, in the past six years, the number of state civil court actions has increased by more than
four million. Michele Galen, Guiltyl, Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 61. Similar explosions have
not been witnessed by the United States' competitors in the European Community ("EC") or
Japan. A recent poll shows that 62% of the United States' senior executives claim that the
civil court system "significantly hampers the ability" of United States businesses to compete
with their EC and Japanese counterparts. Id. at 61, 66. In addition, 83% of these executives
stated that the fear of civil lawsuits more greatly impacts corporate decision-making now than
it did ten years ago. Id. Yet only 10% indicated that the fear of litigation greatly reduces a
company's ability to introduce new products. Id. at 66.
2. Priest, supra note 1, at 184-85. Approximately 25% of the 500 largest United States
corporations have withdrawn products from the market because of liability issues or liability
insurance difficulties. Id. at 184 n.l (citing NATHAN WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILrrY: THE
CORPORATE RESPONSE

4-7 (1987)).

No one conscious of the dwindling budget and meager accomplishments of the Con-
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States' focus on judicial remedies has produced inconsistent solutions
to complex products liability matters. Defendant identification issues
in product defect cases illustrate the lack of cohesion and reliability
that results from relying on the courts to protect consumers and to
police private sector manufacturers.
One of the thorniest legal issues in products liability is the proper
identification of specific tortfeasors in individual plaintiff and mass
tort litigation. Courts and attorneys have wrestled with nontraditional tort approaches in product cases in which the lapse of time and
other factual obstacles make it difficult for plaintiffs, through no fault
of their own, to identify one or all of the wrongdoers. In the absence
of other societal protections for aggrieved plaintiffs, some courts have
relaxed the application of the traditional tort principle of cause-infact. These courts have considered nontraditional causation theories
that address defendant identification, and create some forms of industry-wide products liability. 3 These theories are based largely on the
sumer Product Safety Commission can pretend that the United States makes a serious effort to regulate product quality directly. Instead, our society relies on liability
actions to police the manufacturing process. The prospect of liability judgments affects design and production decisions of all manufacturers, foreign and domestic,
that sell to U.S. consumers (footnote omitted). And increasing numbers of corporate
bankruptcies and reorganizations stem from such judgments. As recently as a decade ago, insurance for products liability was subsumed in general commercial liability coverage, of insufficient importance for separate categorization. Today it is a
growing component of commercial underwriting-indeed growing at such a rate that
foreign and domestic reinsurers have recently been frightened into withdrawing further coverage.
Priest, supra note 1, at 184.
Resorting to litigation may result from the overwhelming task facing budget-strapped,
regulatory agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In the United States,
this Commission receives about 4000 complaints per day, while its Japanese counterpart receives slightly over 400 complaints in an entire year. Ai Nakajima, ProductsLiability. How
Tough a Law; Consumer Advocates Pressfor Endorsement in Planned Interim Report to Prime
Minister, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 31, 1991, at 4.
3. AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3D § 9:2 (1987) [hereinafter AM. LAW]; 63 AM. JUR. 2D
§ 167 (1992) [hereinafter AM. JUR.]; Annotation, "Concert of Activity," "Alternative Liability, " "EnterpriseLiability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One or
More Manufacturers of a Defective Uniform Product, in Absence ofIdentification of Manufacturerof Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 183-94 (1983) [hereinafter Manufacturers Liability]. See generally Christina Urias, Comment, McCormack v. Abbott
Laboratories: Application of Market Share Liability to Resolve the DES Dilemma, 29 ARiz. L.
REV. 155 (1987); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant
in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 941 (1985); Note, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES CausationProblem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981) [hereinafter
Market Share Liability]; Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978) (providing comparisons of competing causation
theories).
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United States' reliance on judicial remedies, as well as the policies of
protecting the injured and deterring wrongdoers.
Overall, there is a great deal of similarity between the basic
United States, European Community ("EC"), and Japanese cause-infact approaches. Each requires plaintiffs, as part of their burden of
proof, to identify defendants in products liability cases. 4 Despite
these basic similarities, the EC and Japan have not yet embraced the
United States' nontraditional approaches to cause-in-fact. While Japan has yet to adopt specific products liability laws, the new EC Products Liability Directive is in its earliest stages of implementation. At
this time, it remains unclear whether the EC or Japan will expand
cause-in-fact approaches to aid defendant identification in products
liability cases in the future. However, a review of products liability
perspectives in the EC and Japan provides insight and suggests that
nontraditional causation theories, like those in the United States, are
not likely to be adopted by these nations.
First, this Article will review traditional United States perspectives on cause-in-fact to identify potential tortfeasors and the established tort policies that support relaxing traditional causation
approaches in many products liability cases. Second, this Article will
discuss the main nontraditional cause-in-fact theories that broaden
potential products liability and have been developed by judicial remedy case-by-case. Third, this Article will provide an overview of the
EC Products Liability Directive, including defendant identification
and statutory limitation provisions that are likely to prevent the development of expansive United States causation theories. In addition,
EC barriers to litigation and social programs further favor extrajudicial remedies to aid injured parties, as opposed to resorting to the
courts and possible nontraditional approaches to defendant identification. Finally, this Article will consider Japan's approach to products
liability and its current cause-in-fact principles. In Japan, the availability of alternative dispute resolution, government regulatory authority and responsibility, as well as public insurance and compensation
funds, suggests that nontraditional causation approaches in products
liability matters are unlikely to be established.
4. This Article focuses on the strict liability and negligence tort theories for product
defects cases in Japan, the EC, and the United States, rather than on contract or other forms of
recovery.

632
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TRADITIONAL CAUSE-IN-FACT PRINCIPLES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SECTION 433B(3) EXCEPTION

Under United States conventional tort theory, a showing of a factual, causal relationship between a defendant's wrongful conduct and
the plaintiff's harm is required to assess liability. 5 As outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 433B, the burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
specific defendant's acts or omissions were the cause-in-fact of the al6
leged harm.
Regardless of the tort theory utilized, the plaintiff is required to
identify the defendant manufacturer making the defective product
that caused the alleged harm.7 Largely through judicial interpreta5. "An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that
matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or
omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984); AM. LAW, supra
note 3, §§ 1:5, 3:1.
In the negligence context, "[i]n order that a negligent actor shall be liable for another's
harm, it is necessary not only that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also
that the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965) [hereinafter RES. TORTS].
In addition, plaintiffs bringing a strict products liability case must also establish a causal
connection between the harm, the defective product, and the nature and identity of the seller in
accordance with the following elements:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Id. § 402A. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
6. As enunciated in the Restatement, "the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of
the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff." RES. TORTS, supra
note 5, § 433B(1). See AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 1:5; AM. JUR., supra note 3, § 164.
The plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that the defendant's conduct was a
cause in fact of the plaintiff's harm. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(1) cmt. a; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 5, § 41. To avoid a directed verdict on the defendant's behalf, the plaintiff
must show more than a bare possibility of causation based upon pure conjecture, speculation,
or the balance of probabilities. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(l) cmt. a; KEETON ET AL.,

supra note 5, § 41.
7. AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 1:5, 1:6, 9:1; AM. JUR., supra note 3, § 164; Annotation,
Products Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of Identification of Defendant as Manufactureror
Seller of ProductAlleged to Have CausedInjury, 51 A.L.R. 3D 1344, 1347-88 (1973) [hereinafter ProductsLiability]. See, e.g., Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177,
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tion, potential defendants have expanded beyond manufacturers to include processors, nonmanufacturing sellers, and other participants in
the chain of distribution of the defective product. 8 In some instances,
products liability has been extended to those endorsing, certifying, or

inspecting products, franchisors and trademark licensors, and may include those otherwise holding the product out as their own.9
However, under an explicit exception in section 433B, the burden
of proof shifts to the defendants regarding cause-in-fact. The issue of
uncertainty as to defendant identification is addressed by section
433B(3):
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.' 0
Shifting the burden of proof in cases of unclear defendant identity is primarily an issue of fairness, based on the tort policy of
preventing wrongdoers from unjustly escaping liability while innocent
plaintiffs are denied an adequate remedy." The dual tort policies of
providing remedies for innocent, injured plaintiffs, and deterring the
introduction of defective products into the marketplace, underlie the
expansion of products liability through nontraditional causation

theories. 12
The Restatement notes that this exception should be used where
1179 (W.D.S.D. 1984); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D.S.C. 1982); Abel
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) (citing
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965)); Cousineau v. Ford Motor
Co., 363 N.W.2d 721, 728 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985) (citing Caldwell
v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1975)). See also ManufacturersLiability, supra note 3, at 184;
RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 430; KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 41.
8. Normally, the plaintiff must prove that a particular defendant manufactured, sold, or
otherwise participated in the distribution of the defective product. AM. LAW, supra note 3,
99 1:6, 1:7; AM. JUR., supra note 3, § 164. See also AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 1:7; AM. JUR.,
supra note 3, § 164.
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(3).
11. See RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(3) cmt. f, stating that "the reason for the exception is the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an
injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their
conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them
caused the harm."
12. See infra notes 17-89 and accompanying text. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causationin Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 736-49 (1982)
(discussing the interrelationship of liability and compensation objectives and causation).
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the actions of the wrongdoers are substantially simultaneous in time,
or are substantially the same in character and in risk of harm to the
plaintiff.' 3 However, the Restatement also notes that:
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of
the rule stated may be necessary because of complications arising
from the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be
joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of time, or

because of substantial differences in the character of the conduct of
the actors or the risks they have created . . . and the situations
which might arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt is made to
deal with such problems in this Section. The rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to precludepossible modification ifsuch situations call for it.14

Clearly, the Restatement leaves the door open for the courts or legislature to craft new or modified cause-in-fact theories to address changing facts and circumstances. In the United States, judicial review and
opinion have revised products liability causation on a case-by-case
basis.
III.

PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION-IN-FACT: UNITED STATES
NON-TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF DEFENDANT
IDENTIFICATION

The child of a war veteran who was exposed to toxic herbicides is
born with serious birth defects. A shipyard worker suffers from a
lung disease after years of working with asbestos materials. An adult
daughter is diagnosed with cervical cancer some twenty years after
her mother ingested diethylstilbesterol ("DES"). Faced with troubling defendant identification problems in products liability cases, the
courts have been forced to balance the establishment of required
cause-in-fact elements, while simultaneously protecting innocent
plaintiffs from injustice and deterring manufacturer wrongdoing. The
four main theories that have developed to address defendant identification difficulties in products liability cases are the "alternative," "enterprise," "market share," and "concerted action" liability
approaches.1 5 To protect injured plaintiffs, all four theories move
13. REs. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(3) cmt. h.
14. Id. (emphasis added). See also AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 9:2-9:3.
15. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:3; AM. JUR., supra note 3, § 167; ManufacturersLiability, supra note 3, at 184-85. See infra notes 17-89 and accompanying text.
Several courts have rejected these theories in product cases while suggesting that the legislature or state supreme courts should recognize their application. See, e.g., Tidier v. Eli Lilly
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products liability toward a certain level of industry-wide liability.
Based on section 433B(3) of the Restatement, these theories developed and primarily applied in instances in which injured plaintiffs,
through no fault of their own, were unable to identify the specific
defendant whose product caused their injuries. Typically, in these instances, it is difficult to link the responsible defendant to the defective
product because of: (1) a time lapse before the manifestation of harmful effects, decreasing record and witness accuracy; or, (2) the fungible
nature or loss or obliteration of the harmful product.16
A.

Alternative Liability

The alternative liability theory1 7 addresses the case in which,
although the actual tortfeasor is unknown, all possible tortfeasors are
known and before the court. This causation theory was initially used
in the classic case of Summers v. Tice.18 In Summers, a member of a
& Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting the expansion of tort theories in DES matters
under Maryland or District of Columbia law); Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988) (Oregon law does not recognize alternative liability in vaccine
cases); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), affm'd without op., 898
F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting industry liability theories for defective breast prosthesis);
Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (in a case of toxic chemical
exposure no trend exists in North Carolina courts to accept nontraditional theories); Lillge v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 602 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (rejecting nontraditional tort theories in an asbestos fibers case); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981) (the
South Carolina Supreme Court must establish exceptions to the traditional cause-in-fact requirement); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (South Carolina's
Supreme Court must carve out exceptions to the cause-in-fact requirement); Case v.
Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987) (refusing to recognize new liability theories in
asbestos cases); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied sub noma.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (rejecting all nontraditional theories in a DES
case); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (in a DES case, alternative causation
theories do not apply without legislative action).
16. See infra notes 17-89 and accompanying text.
17. The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff except:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.
RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(3). See AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:4. See also Andrea
Riger Potash, Note, Bichler v. Lilly: Applying Concerted Action to the DES Cases, 3 PACE L.
REV. 85, 92-94 (1982); Market Share Liability, supra note 3, at 671-72; Sheiner, supra note 3,
at 985-89.
18. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), overruled by Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588
(1980). The Restatement utilizes the fact situation of Summers to illustrate the alternative
theory. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(3) cmt. h, illus. 9.
In certain cases, alternative liability is rejected when the plaintiff knows or should know
the identity of the offending manufacturer. See generally Layton v. Blue Giant Equip. Co., 599
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hunting party sued two fellow hunters who negligently shot at a quail,
wounding the plaintiff instead. Because both hunters fired simultaneously, the plaintiff was unsure which hunter wounded him. However,
he could prove that he had been harmed by the conduct of one of the

defendants and he brought all possible defendants before the court. 19
Each defendant was shown to have acted tortiously toward the plaintiff, although independently of the other. Yet, the nature of the accident made it difficult for the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, to
20
prove which of the two had caused his harm.

Citing the Restatement section 433B, the court determined that
in fairness to the innocent injured party, the two defendants, both
wrongdoers, should be jointly and severally liable. 2 1 The burden of

proof shifted to the defendants, who were better positioned to prove
their own innocence, 22 or else to apportion damages between

themselves. 23

Several courts have utilized a form of alternative liability approach in products liability cases, primarily when all potential defendF. Supp. 93 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1979).
19. Summers, 199 P.2d at 2.
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. Id. at 3-4. The Summers court asserted:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would flow
if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement
that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest.
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a
situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should
rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The injured party has been placed
by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm.
If one can escape the other may also and the plaintiff is remediless. Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused
the injury ....
It is up to the defendants to explain the cause of the injury.
Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 4-5. Summers can be viewed primarily as a damages apportionment case,
rather than one of defendant identification, since both defendants were known and before the
court.
23. Section 433B(2) indicates than when the combined conduct of two or more parties
harms a plaintiff, any resolution of uncertainty as to the apportionment of damages between
known defendants is placed upon the wrongdoers, not the plaintiff-an important concept
underlying the assessment of damages in nontraditional causation theories. The provision
states:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the
ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof
is upon each such actor.
RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 433B(2).
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ants have been brought before the court. 24 For example, in Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co. ,25 the court undertook an extensive review of alternative
liability policy as discussed in the Summers case. The court concluded that it would not only extend the Summers policy of protecting innocent, injured plaintiffs from a lack of remedy, but would also

tailor the legal theory of alternative liability to this type of DES
6

litigation.2
In Abel, similar to Summers, the nearly 200 plaintiff DES daughters could initially demonstrate that they had been injured by the conduct of one of the defendants where all known DES manufacturers

promoting Michigan sales were before the court. 27 Through no fault
of their own, the plaintiffs were unable to identify specifically the responsible tortfeasors due to the fungible nature of DES and the time

lapse. 28 The burden of proof as to causation was then shifted to each

defendant to either exonerate itself or apportion damages between all
29
defendants.
In distinguishing Summers, the Abel court noted that each defendant had been proven negligent toward the plaintiff. In this in24. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:7. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453
(10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing alternative liability in an asbestos case when all possible defendants were before the court); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (an HIV-infected hemophiliac sued all possible defendant manufacturers of the defective
blood product); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Lit., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
affm'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987) (all possible defendant manufacturers of the herbicide "Agent Orange" were before the court); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343
N.W.2d 164 (Mich.), cert. denied sub noma. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 833
(1984) (all manufacturers distributing DES in Michigan were before the court); Ferrigno v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (analogizing to automobile "chain
collision" cases). This alternative approach seems impractical in mass toxic tort cases in which
hundreds of potential defendants may exist.
25. 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984), cert. denied sub nom E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
26. Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 173-74.
27. Id. at 174 n.16.
28. Id. at 175. Due to the fungible nature of DES, plaintiffs were unable to specifically
identify the offending manufacturers. The defendants had utilized a generic marketing approach to the product. In addition, a significant time lapse created a lack of supportable pharmacy records, since Michigan law required pharmacists to maintain records for only a five
year period. Id.
Some 70 plaintiffs argued ingeniously that they both could, and could not, identify the
specific manufacturers. The court applied the established pleading practices which allow for
inconsistent claims. Approximately 113 plaintiffs stated that they were unable to identify the
specifically offending DES manufacturer. Id.
29. Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 174. Defendants might avoid liability by showing that they did
not market the drug in the Michigan area during the relevant time period that the plaintiff's
mother ingested the drugs. Id.
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stance, however, each defendant was negligent toward one plaintiff
but not toward each and every plaintiff.30 To accommodate this distinction, the court applied the alternative liability theory after shifting
the cause-in-fact burden to the defendants, even if it were ultimately
determined that only one unidentifiable defendant caused the plaintiff's harm. 31 Application of alternative liability theory in this way
certainly aids aggrieved plaintiffs, but also places an entire industry at
risk of products liability for harm they may not have caused.
Many courts have rejected the alternative approach in product
cases where the plaintiffs failed to bring in all potential defendants,
reasoning that the actual wrongdoers might escape liability, or that
otherwise innocent defendants might be held liable for a wrong that
they did not commit. 32 Other courts have dismissed claims based on
alternative liability where the plaintiff could have identified the actual
tortfeasors through reasonably diligent efforts, or the wrongdoer's
identification was not properly established due to some fault of the
plaintiff.33
30. Id. at 172-73.
31. Id. at 174.
32. See Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (although Michigan recognizes alternative liability in product cases, it was not applicable because all possible
asbestos manufacturers were not before the court); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d
224 (App. Div. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991) (only six of nearly 100 possible DES
manufacturers were before the court); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333 (II. App.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (no showing that all DES defendants
were before the court); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) (no showing
that the three defendants before the court were the only possible wrongdoers in a DES case);
Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (not all possible DES defendants were
before the court; the actual wrongdoer could escape liability); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144
Cal. App. 3d 583 (1983) (failure to show that any vaccine manufacturers were tortfeasors);
Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1982) (in an exploding
bottles case, there was no showing that all defendants were before the court or that each had
acted tortiously); Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (only 44 potential defendants were before the court).
33. See Layton v. Blue Giant Equip. Co., 599 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (alternative
theory not applicable as plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying the actual
lift-jack manufacturer); Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.D.
1984) (plaintiff failed to identify the manufacturer number stamped on a tire rim); Cousineau
v. Ford Motor Co., 363 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1984) (identification of the manufacturer of a tire rim was possible from wheel); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (plaintiff had already
identified and settled with the particular manufacturer).
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Enterprise Liability

Similar to alternative liability, "enterprise" liability theory34 was

first enunciated in Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 35 Under
this theory, the actual tortfeasors have not been identified through no
fault of the plaintiffs. The court sought to mold creatively the traditional cause-in-fact requirements in order to provide judicial protection of innocent, injured claimants and deter manufacturers of
defective products. Enterprise theory joins as defendants virtually all
members of a small, centralized industry of generically similar products (five to ten producers) 36 who have joint control of the risk that
caused the plaintiffs' injuries. 37 Once the plaintiffs demonstrate that
the defendants breached a duty of care and that they controlled a joint
risk that resulted in plaintiffs' harm, the burden shifts to the defend38
ants to exculpate themselves from liability.
In DuPont, the plaintiffs were children in different states, injured
in blasting cap explosions. 39 Their complaint did not identify a specific tortfeasor of the obliterated product, but brought suit against six
34. Enterprise liability is not available if the manufacturer is identified or if the plaintiff
fails to undertake diligent efforts to identify the applicable manufacturer. See Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.D. 1984) (exploding tire case); Prelick v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (asbestos case); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (DES case). See AM.
JUR., supra note 3, at 147.
Enterprise liability is viewed as a hybrid of the alternative and concerted action theories of
liability, providing for absolute liability for industry members and their attendant industry
association. Sheiner, supra note 3, at 974-75; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:24; AM. JUR, supra
note 3, at 147; ManufacturersLiability, supra note 3, at 185. See also Potash, supra note 17, at
95-106 (discussing the concerted action theory as an offshoot of enterprise liability theory).
35. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 952-54; Sheiner,
supra note 3, at 995-1002 (providing detailed discussion of DuPont).
36. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 378. As to enterprise liability, the DuPont court emphasized
its "special applicability to industries composed of a small number of units. What would be
fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small producers." Id.
Moreover, California's courts rejected the application of the enterprise theory to the DES
industry because that industry involved over 200 manufacturers. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab.,
607 P.2d 924, 935 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). But see Sheiner, supra note 3,
at 995-1007 (providing detailed analysis and recommending the use of enterprise liability in
DES litigation).
37. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 378; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935; AM. LAW, supra note 3,
§ 9:25; ManufacturersLiability, supra note 3, at 185; AM. JUR., supra note 3, at 147.
38. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 379-80; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935; AM. LAW, supra note 3,
§ 9:26; AM. JUR., supra note 3, at 147; ManufacturersLiability, supra note 3, at 185.
39. DuPont,345 F. Supp. at 358-59. The court joined DuPont and Chance v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 57 F.R.D. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), which involved injuries to children from
blasting caps between 1955 and 1959. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 358-59.

640

Loy. L.A. Int' & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 15:629

blasting cap companies that comprised nearly the entire United States
industry and the industry's trade association. 40 Under the facts of the
case, the blasting caps manufacturers acted in compliance with an allegedly insufficient industry-wide labelling standard, after delegating
safety, functionality, labelling, and design responsibilities to their
4
trade association. '
Based on a review of section 433B of the Restatement, the court
determined that the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defective, generic product was made by one of the
defendants, but need not identity the specific manufacturer who made
the injurious blasting cap.4 2 The DuPont court determined that this
small group of manufacturers and their industry association had
jointly controlled the risk that resulted in the injury to the plaintiffs
and, therefore, could be held jointly and severally liable for the harm.
As to causation, the burden of proof then shifted to the defendants to
43
extricate themselves from the joint enterprise.
Unlike the alternative liability theory, the enterprise theory does
not require that all potential tortfeasors appear before the court. 44
Plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence that one of
the defendants before the court caused the injury. 45 The defendants
are not viewed as acting independently in their tortious activities but
as maintaining joint control over the tortious risks of injury. 4 6
Under the doctrine of products liability, the enterprise theory ex40. The plaintiffs in Chance were unable to determine the actual manufacturers of the
blasting caps, while in DuPont the defendant manufacturers were known. DuPont, 345 F.
Supp. at 358. The DuPont court adopted the notion of enterprise liability. Id. at 376-80.
41. Id. at 359. DuPont raised the specter of trade associations handling safety, certification and associated duties for industry manufacturers incurring liability in products liability
cases. See generally Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa, The Trade Association and
Product Safety Standards: Of Good Samaritans and Liability, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 37 (1988);
William C. Becker, Trade Association and Product Liability, 16 CAP. U. L. REV. 581 (1987).
42. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 379. The defendants contended that the enterprise theory
was inappropriate because the blasting caps involved in the accidents may have come from
foreign manufacturers or defunct domestic firms, and not the named domestic manufacturers.
Id However, the court indicated that the chance of unknown businesses having supplied the
blasting caps did not alter the plaintiffs' burden of proof. Id. The plaintiffs needed only to
show that it was more likely than not that the caps involved were made by one of the named
domestic manufacturers. Id.
43. Id. at 378-79.
44. Plaintiffs should sue 75% to 80% of the relevant market to maximize the probability
that the offending manufacturer is one of the named defendants. AM. LAW, supra note 3,
§ 9:24.
45. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. at 379. See also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 378-79. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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pands potential liability to an industry-wide level. No other courts
have directly embraced the theory, although some have considered its
viability within certain fact situations.47 Many courts have expressly
rejected the enterprise approach as violating traditional causation

principles. 48 Other courts have refused to apply enterprise liability
theory because the defendants were not part of a small, centralized
industry. These cases reject the theory when there is an unwieldy
number of potential defendants in industries with large numbers of
manufacturers. 49 Furthermore, courts have rejected the theory for
failure to show inadequate industry-wide standards or joint control of
the risk through delegation of product safety functions to an industrywide trade association. 50
C

Market Share Liability

Market share liability theory is one of the most controversial alternative approaches to defendant identification.5" Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,52 introduced the theory. In Sindell, the plaintiff class
members were unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES
purchased due to its fungible nature. Plaintiffs were unable to locate
47. Although other courts have not embraced DuPont, certain cases have adopted aspects
of the enterprise liability theory. See Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 299
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (a deficient industry-wide bottling standard may support the concerted
action or enterprise liability theories); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353
(E.D. Tex.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing a form of
industry-wide enterprise liability in an asbestos case).
48. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1102 (1983) (asbestos case); Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (asbestos case); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981)
(DES case); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (DES case); Mulcahy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) (DES case); Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co.,
427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (DES case).
49. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (asbestos
case); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1989) (DES case); Smith v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 527 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990);
Farmer v. City of Newport, 748 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. App. 1988) (mattress industry case).
50. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (asbestos
case); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Pa), aff'd without opinion,
826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1986) (asbestos case); Farmer v. City of Newport, 748 S.W.2d 162 (Ky.
App. 1988) (mattress industry case); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583 (Ct.
App. 1983) (DES case); Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div.
1982) (exploding bottles case).
51. For an excellent discussion of market share liability and variant forms of the theory
in the United States, see Andrew B. Nace, Market Share Liability: A CurrentAssessment of a
Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1991).
52. 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95460; Market Share Liability, supra note 3, at 672-80; Nace, supra note 51, at 398-403.
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applicable records or relevant witnesses due to the lapse of time.53
The court expressed its concern that plaintiffs' inability to identify the
specific manufacturer would leave injured parties without a remedy
54
while allowing wrongdoers to escape liability.
After rejecting the alternative and enterprise theories of liability,
the court fashioned a market share theory. This invention required
plaintiffs to join a "substantial share" of the market manufacturers of
generically similar DES. 5 5 Liability was based on the manufacturer's
share of the relevant market of the defective product. 56 The court
reasoned that with a substantial share of the market before it, the
actual wrongdoers were less likely to escape liability and could approximate their own corresponding liability in accordance with their
share of the market. 57 Once plaintiffs joined a substantial portion of
the market, the burden shifted to each defendant to prove it could not
have made the product that injured the plaintiffs.58 Damages were
then apportioned among the remaining defendants. 59
Similar to the enterprise theory, but unlike the alternative liabil53. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936. In some instances, attempts to use market share have been
rejected when the plaintiff knew, or through reasonable efforts could determine, the actual
manufacturer's identity and join it in the case. See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (HIV-tainted blood products); Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531
F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (asbestos case).
54. The Sindell court stated:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be
traced to any specific producer. The response of courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to
fashion remedies to meet these changing needs ....
The Restatement comments that
modification of the Summers rule may be necessary in a situation like that before us
....
The most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that
advanced in Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of injury.
607 P.2d at 936. See also AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:30.
55. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. Plaintiffs sued manufacturers who comprise approximately
90% of the market. Id. The court recognized the potential difficulties in defining the market
and identifying market share, but left it to the jury to determine the appropriate relationship as
in comparative fault decisions. Id. Commentators have criticized the failure of the Sindell
court to deal more specifically with these practical concerns. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95658; Urias, supra note 3, at 156-57, 160-62; Nace, supra note 51, at 420-25.
56. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. See AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:28.
57. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. See Market Share Liability, supra note 3, at 678; Nace,
supra note 51, at 402; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:33; Robinson, supra note 12, at 736-49
(criticizing the Sindell market share approach to fairness in allocating liability).
58. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. See also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 955-56; Market Share
Liability, supra note 3, at 672; Nace, supra note 51, at 401-02.
59. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. See also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 955-56; Market Share
Liability, supra note 3, at 672-73; Nace, supra note 51, at 401-02.
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ity theory, the market share liability theory only requires plaintiffs to
join a substantial number of all potential defendants. 60 The market
share liability theory is better suited to a plaintiff class action against a
large, decentralized industry than is the enterprise theory. 6' Plaintiffs' burden of proof is eased by holding industry participants potentially liable for injuries that their competitors may have caused.
Other courts hearing DES cases have accepted the Sindell approach or some variation of the market liability theory. 62 Outside the
DES context, several courts have applied some form of the market
share liability theory. 63 Courts that decline to apply the approach do
so because the plaintiff failed to join a substantial share of the market
or to show that the defective products were generically similar. 64 Beyond this, courts that refuse to adopt other nontraditional causation
theories similarly reject the market share liability theory in any
context. 65
D.

Concerted Action

The doctrine of concerted action is another nontraditional theory
that expands tort products liability where defendant identification is
60. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
61. Market Share Liability, supra note 3, at 675.
62. McCormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985); McElhaney v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Conley v. Boyle
Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. App. 1984), rev'don other grounds, 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1991);
Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37
(Wis.), cert. denied sub. norm E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Miles
Lab., Inc. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 587 (1982).
63. See Morris v. Parke Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Morris v.
Parke Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (applying California's substantive law
to allow market share liability in a vaccine case); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F.
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex.), rev'd in parton other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing a
form of market share in asbestos litigation). But see Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the use of market share in a vaccine case); Vigiolto
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454, aff'd without opinion, 826 F.2d 1058 (3rd Cir.
1986) (rejecting the use of market share in asbestos litigation); Lillge v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
602 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (rejecting market share liability in asbestos fibers case);
Shackil v. Lederle Lab., 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting market share liability in a vaccine
case).

64. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding
that asbestos is not a fungible product and no substantial share of market was joined in the
case); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (asbestos products
are not fungible and the largest manufacturer was not joined as a defendant); Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Com. P1. 1986) (no showing that tire rims are
fungible products).
65. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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not possible. The concerted action theory serves the policy of providing a remedy for innocent, injured plaintiffs while deterring wrongdoers. Section 876 of the Restatement indicates that liability will flow to
all those whose tortious conduct, pursuant to a common design or
plan, causes harm to a third party. 66 The common design or scheme
may be based upon an express agreement or a tacit understanding
67
between the wrongdoers.

The concerted action theory expands liability beyond those actually taking part in the tortious action and includes those who both aid
or encourage the actual wrongdoer or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's action for their own benefit. 68 Each defendant is held jointly
and severally liable for the damages and may seek contribution from
69
other tortfeasors.
66. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 876, states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
Id. See also AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 9:18, 9:20; AM. JUR., supra note 3, § 167; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 5, § 46.
67. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 876 cmt. a; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:21; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 5, § 46.
Most courts and commentators indicate that "conscious parallelism" alone supports the
establishment of a tacit understanding under the concert of activity theory. See, e.g.,
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989);
Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.D. 1984) (multi-rim tire
case); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333 (I11.
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 560 N.E.2d
324 (Ill. 1988) (DES case); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980) (DES case). See also Timothy J. Langella, Note, Bichler v. Eli Lilly: An Improper
Use of Conscious Parallelismas Evidence of Concerted Action, 62 B.U. L. REV. 633, 645 (1982)
("Conscious parallelism" is a term drawn from antitrust law concerning "the common practice
of conducting similar businesses in a uniform manner, with each business aware that the others
are pursuing the same course of action."). But see Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625
(App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982) (lower court in a DES case accepted
conscious parallelism as sufficient for a concerted action claim).
68. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 876 ("[a]dvice or encouragement to act operates as a
moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same
effect upon liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance."). Id. cmt. d. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 46; AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 9:18, 9:20; AM. JUR., supra
note 3, § 167.
69. RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 876 cmt. a; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:19; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 5, §§ 46, 52. As explained in REs. TORTS, supra note 5, § 876 cmt. a, "each
becomes subject to liability for the acts of the others, as well as his own acts. The theory of the
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The concerted action theory is usually applied instead of other
nontraditional theories when the plaintiff knows the actual tortfeasor
but wishes to expand the liability to include others who acted in concert with the wrongdoer. 70 The principle of the concerted action theory derives from criminal guilt arising from aiding and abetting
another in a crime. 7 1 Unlike the other nontraditional approaches, the
concerted action theory has unintentionally been used to ease the
plaintiff's burden of proof for causation in civil actions. 72
The Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co. 7 3 case exemplifies the recent
application of concerted action to tort products liability cases in
which the actual wrongdoer's identity is unknown. In Cousineau,
plaintiff's decedent was killed when a truck tire with a multi-piece
rim exploded upon repair. 74 The rim parts of the tire were initially set
aside at the manufacturer, but over time they were mixed with the
general rim stock. The interchangeable nature of these rims, coupled
with the time lapse, made identifying the specific manufacturer impossible. 75 The plaintiff sued all multi-rim tire manufacturers, as well
early common law was that there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which
made all liable for the tortious acts of any one." Id.
70. Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 565 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (App. Div. 1991);
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Cousineau v. Ford Motor
Co., 363 N.W.2d 721, 728 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); Abel v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); AM. LAW, supra note
3, § 9:19.
71. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 46; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:18.
Initially, it was assumed that the concerted action principle would deter criminal or antisocial activities. See, e.g., Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531 (Ore. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 710
P.2d 147 (Ore. 1985) (passenger refilling marijuana pipe for driver); Price v. Halstead, 355
S.E.2d 380 (W. Va. 1987) (passenger encouraging drug and alcohol use by driver); Herman v.
Westgate, 464 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div. 1983) (tortfeasors encouraged others to push people
off a barge at a stag party); Lemmons v. Kelly, 397 P.2d 784 (Ore. 1964) (tortfeasors encouraged drag racing); Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (tortfeasors encouraged drag racing); Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968) (tortfeasors
encouraged drag racing); Carney v. DeWees, 70 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1949) (tortfeasors encouraged drag racing).
For an excellent discussion of the historical purposes and uses of concerted action and
criticism of its use in a products liability context, see Burton N. Lipshie & Jay Mayesh, Recent
Ruling Resurrecting Concerted Action Sounds Sour Note for US. Manufacturers, N.Y. L.J.,
July 10, 1991, at 1.
72. Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 176; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 9:19. Some courts have rejected
concerted action in product liability cases stating that it cannot overcome defendant identification problems. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (DES case);
Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
73. 363 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).
74. Cousineau, 363 N.W.2d at 725.
75. Id. at 727.
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76
as the vehicle's manufacturers.
The Cousineau court rejected the plaintiff's alternative liability
claim, because the inability to identify the rim did not stem from the
defendants' conduct and the rims had been set aside for possible identification by the plaintiff for a long period after the accident. 77 Similar
to the enterprise and market share theories, but unlike alternative liability, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that all potential wrongdoers
are before the court because the concerted action theory provides for
joint and several liability. 7 8 The court indicated that the plaintiff
could utilize the concerted action theory by showing that the defendants before the court had jointly engaged in the tortious activity that
caused the plaintiff's harm. 79 Here, the alleged joint activity occurred
when the tire rim industry acted pursuant to a common design in
jointly breaching their duty to warn rim users of the danger of multirim products. 80 The plaintiff claimed that the tire rim industry's joint
efforts for rim standardization and interchangeability posed a known
safety hazard. 8' Through industry lobbying efforts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to meet their duty of care when they
shifted their responsibility to warn employers of the potentially dangerous rims.8 2 In addition, the plaintiff claimed that the decedent received no prior warning of the danger from the tire rim
76. Id. at 725. The plaintiff sued the six major manufacturers of multi-piece wheel rims,
as well as three vehicle manufacturers. However, the court's review of concerted action focused exclusively on the wheel manufacturers. See id. at 728-30.
77. Id. at 727. In reviewing Abel, the Cousineau court noted important factual distinctions. In Abel, the type of DES ingested by the mothers could not be identified due to the
number of possible defendants, the passage of time, the drug's generic nature, and the industry's marketing scheme. Cousineau, 363 N.W.2d at 727. In Cousineau, the type of rim was
interchangeable, but not generic, and was identifiable if plaintiff had retrieved it from the employer. Id. As to the vehicle manufacturers, the court noted that they did not participate in
the generic manufacture and marketing of multi-piece rims, and incurred no liability for a
component that they did not manufacture. Id. at 727-28.
78. The Cousineau court noted that,
[Tihe identification problem is not a sine qua non of a concert of action claim. Each
defendant who acted jointly and tortiously is liable, even though his conduct is not
the direct cause of the action. Thus, in the context of this case, we hold that it does
not matter if the party causing the injury in fact is not joined in the concert of action
claim, since all those acting in concert, named and unnamed defendants, are jointly
and severally liable for the entire harm [citation omitted].
Cousineau, 363 N.W.2d at 728.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 729.
81. Id. The plaintiff supplied documentation showing that the manufacturers shared information and charts indicating which products were safe to interchange and which were not
while making no efforts to improve their products' designs. Id.
82. Cousineau, 363 N.W.2d at 729. The manufacturers, through their industry associa-
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manufacturers, nor did the industry supply any warnings with their
products. 83 The court indicated that it was up to a jury to determine
legal responsibility as to whether this joint conduct caused the harm
84
under the theory of concerted action.
Several other courts have accepted the use of concerted action in
product defect cases in which defendant identification is not possible. 85 Concerted action has also been sanctioned to expand tort products liability to other manufacturers within an industry, even when
the actual manufacturer is known and before the court. 86 This nontraditional theory also expands liability to an industry-wide level
based on industry lobbying efforts or trade association activities.
A number of courts have rejected this principle in products liability cases,8 7 some out of concern that all industry manufacturers
would become liable for the products of their competitors. 8 Other
courts have refused to adopt concerted action in product defect cases
in which the guilty manufacturer has been identified, thereby provid89
ing viable remedies and effective deterrents.
All four nontraditional theories illustrate the efforts of United
States courts to deal creatively with the cause-in-fact requirement of
defendant identification. In most instances, the plaintiff's inability to
identify the specific defendant arises from time lapses that destroy option, undertook a lobbying campaign to prevent the establishment of safety regulations requiring safety warnings that might burden their industry. Id. at 726, 729.
83. Id. at 729.
84. Id.
85. Farmer v. City of Newport, 748 S.W.2d (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (defective, combustible
mattress case); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co, 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833
(1984) (DES case); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 436
N.E.2d 182 (1982) (the lower court embraced concerted action, but the appellate court held
only that the trial court's instructions on concerted action were not erroneous).
86. Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 565 N.Y.S.2d 889 (App. Div. 1991) (defective multi-rim tire case).
87. See, e.g., Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.D. 1984)
(multi-piece rim tire case); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983) (DES
case); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989) (asbestos case); Goldman v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (asbestos case); Celotex Corp. v.
Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985) (asbestos case); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App.
3d 583 (Ct. App. 1983) (DES case); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (DES
case); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980) (DES case).
88. See, e.g., Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Com. P1.
1986); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (multipiece tire rim cases).
89. See, e.g., Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (asbestos
case); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (DES case); Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (DES case).
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portunities to secure supportive evidence, or from the fungible or obliterated nature of products that defy separate identification. Some
United States courts balance the protection of an injured plaintiff with
the deterrence of defective product marketing.
In some cases, these efforts have yielded industry-wide liability,
with manufacturers being held responsible for the defective products
of their competitors. Other courts have adhered strictly to traditional
cause-in-fact requirements, that leave injured plaintiffs without remedies and manufacturers without a deterrent. These differing views on
cause-in-fact continue to confuse United States plaintiffs, manufacturers, industry associations, and others in the chain of distribution in
products liability litigation.
IV.

CAUSE-IN-FACT PRINCIPLES AND THE

EC PRODUCTS

LIABILITY DIRECTIVE

A.

Overview of EC Products Liability Directive

In 1957, several European nations joined to form a single market
of common trade policies with harmonized national laws facilitating
the unhampered movement of people, goods, and capital among the
member states. 90 To further this objective, the Council of Ministers of
the European Communities promulgated council directives on agricultural, monetary, consumer, transportation, and other commercial
policies governing trade within and outside the EC. 91 After the adoption of a directive, member states are required to implement national
laws consistent with EC directives by a particular deadline with cer92
tain allowances for local deviations.
Early in the mid-1970s, the EC recognized that differences in
products liability laws might restrain the free flow of products, lessen
competition among producers, and lead to the unequal protection of
consumers. 93 During nearly ten years of debate on a uniform prod90. The EC's current twelve Member States are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practiceand
Impact on US. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 65-66 (1989);
Heinz J. Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive on ProductLiability, 20 INT'L LAW 1391, 1391-92 (1986).
91. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 65.
92. Id. at 66; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1392. The directive creates no individual rights
or remedies but compels member nations to pass national legislation implementing each directive. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 83; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1392.
93. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 65-67; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1391-92; Lori M.
Linger, Note, The Products Liability Directive: A Mandatory Development Risks Defense, 14
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ucts liability directive, the EC wrestled with a number of major issues,

including the consideration of a fault-based or strict liability system,
the proper application of a "development risks" defense (the state-ofthe-art defense in the United States), and possible limitations on dam-

ages and time periods for producer liability. 94 Finally, in 1985, the
EC adopted a compromise council directive on liability for defective
products for harmonization by member communities. 95 In a compromise, the 1985 directive contains options for national implementation
97
of development risks96 and damage limitation issues.
The EC Directive addressed the need for a unified perspective on
L.J. 478, 479 (1990-91). Prior to the enactment of the council directive on
products liability, the only uniformity on product defect lawsuits was a convention dealing
with conflicts of laws issues. Id.
94. Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1391-92; Linger, supra note 93, at 480-83; Sara F. Liebman, Note, The European Community's Products Liability Directive: Is the US. Experience
Applicable?, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 795, 800 (1986).
95. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) [hereinafter Directive]. See generally
Linger, supra note 93, at 479-83 (providing historical background on the development of the
EC product liability directive). Because of the difficult obstacles in harmonizing products liability laws, the member states resisted implementing the directive, with only three nations (the
United Kingdom, Greece, and Italy) adopting harmonized laws prior to the 1988 deadline.
Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante:Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European
Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 708 (1991).
96. Article 7(e) of the EC Directive provides a state-of-the-art defense for producers,
which is then undermined by Article 15 of the Directive. Article 15 states that each member
state may,
(b) by way of derogation from Article 7(e), maintain or ... provide in this legislation
that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the state of scientific and
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not
such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered.
Directive, supra note 95, art. 15.
Therefore, each member nation may decide whether to include a state-of-the-art defense
in their enabling national legislation. This option will likely divide the community and result
in nonuniform products liability practices, particularly for research-driven products such as
chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 74-76; Liebman, supra note 94,
at 805. For example, Germany adopted the notion of the development risks defense for
pharmaceuticals, while France supports the defense in many product cases, but not those involving pharmaceuticals. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 75. However, most member states
are expected to adopt a state-of-the-art defense, with the exception of Luxembourg, France,
and Belgium. Linger, supra note 93, at 490-91.
97. Article 16 of the Directive states that "a producer's total liability for damage resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the same defect shall be
limited to an amount which may not be less than 70 million ECU." Directive, supra note 95,
art. 16. See Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 76; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1399. Allowing a
cap was supported by some member nations as necessary to mitigate the rigors of strict liability. Liebman, supra note 94, at 806-07. The vague language of article 16 makes it unclear
whether claims should be aggregated to reach the ceiling amount or the effect on remaining
injured plaintiffs if the fund has been exhausted. Id.
FORDHAM INT'L
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products liability based on trade and consumer concerns, stating at
the outset that:
approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the
liability of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of
his products is necessary because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the
consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his
health and property ....98

Article 1 of the EC Directive states that "[t]he producer shall be
liable for damage caused by a defect in his product." 99 The term
"product" basically includes all movables, even those incorporated
into immovables, with the main exception of game and agricultural
products.100 Similar to the United States approach, the term "producer" includes manufacturers of finished goods or component parts,
importers, suppliers, and any party that presents himself as the producer through name, trademark, or other distinguishing feature.10
The EC Directive mandates the implementation of the theory of
strict liability without requiring a demonstration of fault or privity of
contract, similar to the United States strict liability. 0 2 Under the EC
Directive, defectiveness is based upon the consumer's expectation of
98. Directive, supra note 95, pmbl.
99. Id. art. 1.
100. Article 2 of the EC Directive states:
For the purpose of this Directive "product" means all movables, with the exception
of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another
movable or into an immovable. "Primary agricultural products" means the products
of the soil, of stock-farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing. "Product" includes electricity.
Directive, supra note 95, art. 2.
The EC Directive allows member states the option to decide if agricultural products and
game should be included within the meaning of the term "product." Directive, supra note 95,
art. 15(a). See Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 69-71 (discussing unstated and excluded
products).
101. The EC Directive provides the definition of "producer" as follows:
1. "Producer" means the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any
raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents
himself as its producer.
2. Without prejudice to the liability of the producer, any person who imports.. . in
the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer within the meaning of this
directive and shall be responsible as a producer.
Directive, supra note 95, art. 3.
102. The EC Directive states:
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safety,103 analogous to the United States strict liability approach to
"unreasonably dangerous" products. 1°0
The injured party is required to prove the damage, 0 5 the defect, 10 6 and the causal relationship between the defect and the damage. 10 7 Basically, this causation approach is identical to United States
cause-in-fact principles. As with the United States traditional approach, a portion of the causal relationship requires the injured party
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of
adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a
fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production ....
Whereas liability without fault should apply only to movables which have been
industrially produced ....
Directive, supra note 95, pmbl.
Some member nations have no previous experience with strict liability and may encounter
difficulties transitioning to its use. Linger, supra note 93, at 483; EEC. "Legal Minefield" in
Liability Directive, WORLD INS. REP., May 27, 1988. For example, Italy has traditionally
followed the notion of proof of negligence in product defect cases, derived from the Napoleonic
Code. Id.
Many northern European nations have had some experience with strict liability. Id.
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg have always imposed strict liability for defective product
cases. Linger, supra note 93, at 483 n.35. In 1976, Germany implemented strict liability for
pharmaceuticals in response to the thalidomide catastrophe. Dielmann, supra note 90, at
1393; Liebman, supra note 94, at 803.
Regardless of member nations' experience with strict liability, most commentators agree
that product defect insurance rates will likely rise by five to twenty percent. Bernstein, supra
note 95, at 685; Brad Durham, Who's Liable Now?, WORLDPAPER, Aug. 1988, at 13.
103. The EC Directive states:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be
put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better
product is subsequently put into circulation.
Directive, supra note 95, art. 6.
In determining defectiveness, there is no reference to fitness for its intended purposes, but
one may consider the issue of consumer misuse of the product. Id. pmbl.
104. Under the notion of strict products liability, an "unreasonably dangerous" product is
determined by the "dangerous extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics." RES. TORTS, supra note 5, § 402A cmt. i. See Thieffry et al., supra note
90, at 71 n.34.
105. Damage means death, personal injuries or property destruction, or damage when
such property is intended for private use and consumption, under the Directive. However, it
does not advocate other than compensatory damages, leaving the option available to member
states to include non-material damages. Directive, supra note 95, art. 9.
106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
107. In Article 4, the EC Directive states that "[t]he injured person shall be required to
prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage." Directive, supra note 95, art. 4. See supra notes 5-6.
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to identify the producer. 10 8
As in the United States, producers have a number of defenses
available to them, including the ability to exonerate themselves from
liability if they can show that they did not manufacture or distribute
the defective product. 109 However, to assure protection of the consumer, a producer is not allowed to contractually exclude its tort liability for manufacturing or distributing a defective product. 110
Although the EC Directive has not resulted in a uniform approach to products liability,111 it does provide strong guidance on
products liability trends within the EC, particularly with defendant
identification. However, despite some basic similarities between
United States and EC causation approaches, the EC will not likely
follow the United States' nontraditional approaches to cause-in-fact.
Many United States defendant identification issues have arisen in
cases where the victim's ability to identify the defendant is complicated by time lapse or loss of the defective product. The EC, on the
other hand, will most likely avoid the need for developing such nontraditional theories since the explicit language of the Directive attempts to prevent defendant identification problems from ever arising.
B.

Defendant Identification under the EC Directive

With so many different products flowing between nations, the EC
Directive addresses the problem consumers have identifying defendants by setting out clearly defined responsibilities for product suppliers. The EC Directive states:
Where the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier of the product shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured person, within a reasonable time, of the identity
108. The EC Directive requires the supplier of a defective product to provide the identity
of the producer to the injured person for prosecution of a claim. Directive, supra note 95, art.

3(3).
109. Article 7 of the Directive spells out six main defenses for producers. See Directive,
supra note 95, art. 7. See Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 73-76; Dielmann, supra note 90, at
1396-98; Linger, supra note 93, at 488-89. The EC Directive states that producers are not liable
for a defective product if they can show that they did not manufacture, distribute, or otherwise
put the product into circulation. Directive, supra note 95, art. 7(a), (c).
110. Directive, supra note 95, art. 12. The directive policy for this limitation is based upon
an effort to effectively protect consumers. Id. pmbl., para. 12.
111. The options in the EC Directive, the vagaries of its language, and future interpretations in national courts will likely erode a monolithic approach to products liability in the EC.
Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 84-85. In addition, the EC Directive does not impact product
warranty actions brought under contractual liability in the buyer-seller relationship. Directive,
supra note 95, art. 13; Bernstein, supra note 95, at 684.
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of the producer or of the person who supplied him with the product. The same shall apply, in the case of an imported product, if
this product does not indicate the identity of the importer referred
to in paragraph 2, even if the name of the producer is indicated. 112
The Directive confronts defendant identification problems by requiring the supplier or other known member in the chain of distribution to inform the injured consumer of the producer's identity within
a reasonable period of time. If the supplier fails to do so, the supplier
will be viewed as the producer for liability purposes. 1 3 This requires
suppliers, or those members in the chain of product distribution who
are known, to maintain adequate records for ten years" 14 if they wish
to avoid liability. 15 This approach identifies a defendant and provides a potential remedy without the cumbersome case-by-case development of expansive liability theories found in the United States.
For example, if a consumer is injured by DES and is unaware of
the identity of the actual producer, the injured plaintiff has the option
to seek compensation from the retailer. If the retailer wishes to avoid
liability, the retailer must maintain clear records about the DES
wholesalers and inform the consumer of their identities. If the retailer
can identify the actual DES manufacturer, the DES wholesalers will
not be liable. If identified, the actual manufacturers may try to exon16
erate themselves under available defenses."
Under the EC Directive, proper record-keeping will facilitate
rapid and conclusive identification of the responsible party in the
chain of distribution.' 17 Therefore, injured plaintiffs are not left without a remedy, while the potential for industry-wide liability is skillfully averted. Unlike the broadened United States causation theories,
parties in the chain of distribution are aware of their potential liability
at the outset and can take adequate steps to protect themselves
through proper record-keeping. EC plaintiffs and defendants are unlikely to be subjected to the lack of predictability resulting from case112. Directive, supra note 95, art. 3(3).
113. Id.; Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 69; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1392; Linger,
supra note 93, at 485-86; R. Redmond Cooper, Product Liability The Problem of the Unknown Defendant - I, SOLIC. J., Aug. 29, 1986, at 643.
114. Directive, supra note 95, art. 11; Cooper, supra note 113, at 643.
115. Cooper, supra note 113, at 643.
116. See id.
117. See Thieifry et al., supra note 90, at 69; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1392; Cooper,
supra note 113, at 643.
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by-case consideration of nontraditional causation approaches, as
found in the United States.
C

Statutes of Limitation and Repose

Statutes of limitation set a maximum time period in which one
must bring a claim or lose that claim forever." 18 These statutes try to
prevent defendants from being subjected to an unlimited time period
of liability. By focusing on plaintiff conduct, these statutes compel
plaintiffs to bring claims promptly, rather than purposely and unfairly
delaying claims to disadvantage defendants. The statutes also help
avoid loss of memory, witness testimony, or other vital documents
which refute or support claims. 119
Statutes of limitation vary depending on the nature of the specific
cause of action. 120 In tort actions, generally, these statutes begin to
run on the date of the alleged injury.' 2 1 This practice presumes that
the plaintiff is aware of the injury, the cause of the injury, and the
party responsible for the injury. 122 Therefore, the statute of limitations in tort is best used where injury is immediately perceptible, such
as an auto accident, but is less useful in cases of latent or imperceptible injuries. 123 Courts have developed the discovery rule to
avoid the harsh effects of leaving innocent, injured plaintiffs without
remedies. 124
The discovery rule focuses on the plaintiffs' conduct and knowledge about the facts and circumstances of their injury. 12 5 The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations, which begins to run on the
date the injured parties knew or should have discovered their injury,
126
the cause of the injury, and the responsible party.
118. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:1. The product manufacturer or seller may plead the
statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Id. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
prove that the statute was tolled or the discovery rule applies. Id.
119. Id.; John M. Felder, Comment, Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories: DES and the Statute of Limitations, 17 PAC. L.J. 1529, 1537 (1986).
120. AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 47:2, 47:3, 47:5.
121. Id. § 47:18.
122. See Felder, supra note 119, at 1538; AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 47:27, 47:28.
123. AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 47:18, 47:28. See Felder, supra note 119, at 1538-43.
124. AM. LAW, supra note 3, §§ 47:27, 47:28.
125. Id. §§ 47:28, 47:34, 47:55. It is important to note that "[t]he discovery rule is not
intended to reward a plaintiff's ignorance as to the nature of the injury or its cause, but generally imposes a burden upon the claimant to exercise within the limitations period reasonable
diligence in ascertaining the operative facts and whether the injury is legally compensable."
Id. § 47:55.
126. Id. §§ 47:28, 47:29; Felder, supra note 119, at 1538-39.
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Through no fault of their own, many products liability plaintiffs
may not be aware of their injury, the product that caused their injury,
or the manufacturer of the product. The discovery rule is responsible
for the opportunities many delayed products liability claims have received to even be heard by courts. In the United States, nontraditional causation theories have often been introduced when the
harmful effects of a product are not discovered until decades later.
The discovery rule has allowed United States courts to deal with
product defect cases where the time lapse complicates defendant identification. Therefore, United States courts often must consider nontraditional approaches to causation to remedy injured consumers and
to punish manufacturers.
The EC Directive outlines a three-year statute of limitations with
a discovery rule that extends the potential liability period. The Directive states:
Member States shall provide in their legislation that a limitation
period of three years shall apply to proceedings for the recovery of
damages as provided for in this Directive. The limitation period
shall begin to run from the day on which the plaintiff became
of the damage,
aware, or should reasonably have become aware,
127
the defect and the identity of the producer.

Coupled with the defendant identification clause in Article 3, the
statute of limitations allows the injured plaintiff an opportunity to discover the defendant's identity, with the assistance of applicable suppliers, within three years of the date the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the injury. The EC Directive seeks to strike a balance, however, between the protection of consumers and the economic needs of
producers on the issue of time limitations. 28 In exchange for providing plaintiffs with the defendant identification provision, the Directive
contains a ten-year overall ceiling on producer liability for defendants. 129 The EC Directive mandates that:
127. Directive, supra note 95, art. 10(1). Article 10(2) indicates that the Directive will not
impact tolling periods permitted under national laws. Id. art. 10(2).
128. Policy statements within the directive state:
Whereas a uniform period of limitation for the bringing of an action for compensation is in the interests both of the injured person and of the producer;
Whereas products age in the course of time, higher safety standards are developed and the state of science and technology progresses; whereas, therefore, it would
not be reasonable to make the producer liable for an unlimited period for the defectiveness of his product; whereas, therefore, liability should expire after a reasonable
length of time, without prejudice to claims pending at law ....
Id. pmbl., paras. 9-10.
129. Directive, supra note 95, art. 11.
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Member States shall provide in their legislation that the rights conferred upon the injured person pursuant to this Directive shall be
extinguished upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date
on which the producer put into circulation the actual product
which caused the damage, unless the injured person 13has
in the
0
meantime instituted proceedings against the producer.
The ten-year ceiling is a statute of repose layered on top of the
statute of limitations, which begins on the date of product distribution. A statute of repose provides a clearly defined time limit on the
duration of manufacturer liability, regardless of plaintiff knowledge of
injury or its cause.' 3 ' By focusing on the product rather than the
plaintiff's conduct or knowledge, the statute of repose provides predictability to manufacturers by reducing the risk of limitless liability
132
for products sold decades ago.

The considerable time lapse often associated with latent injuries
from defective products will leave many innocent, injured plaintiffs
without civil remedies and allow tortfeasors to escape liability. This
same concern led to the development of nontraditional theories of
cause-in-fact in United States DES and asbestos product liability actions. Clearly, this EC provision tolerates circumstances in which injured claimants are left without civil remedies, while producers of
defective products avoid responsibility for injurious products.
In the United States, only a few states have enacted statutes of
repose in products liability actions. 33 Generally, United States statutes of repose run from specific dates, such as the date of purchase or
delivery of the product. 34 Statutes of repose for tort products liability claims have not been widely embraced in the United States, in part
because of the concern that a plaintiff's rights may expire before the
130. Id.
131. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:55; Felder, supra note 119, at 1543. Claimants bringing
an action in states with a statute of repose must still comply with the time limits imposed by
the statute of limitations. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:57.
132. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:55; Felder, supra note 119, at 1543.
133. Some form of statute of repose for products liability matters can be found in Arizona
(12 years), Colorado (7 years), Connecticut (10 years), Georgia (10 years), Indiana (10 years),
Nebraska (10 years), North Carolina (6 years), Oregon (8 years), and Tennessee (10 years).
AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:55 n.7. Some states also limit the application of the statute of
repose to certain theories of liability. Id. § 47:60.
134. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:65. Depending upon the statute of repose, the liability
period might also commence on the date a product was first leased for use or consumption,
first used by other than the manufacturer, lessor or seller, or the date the manufacturer or

seller gives up possession or control of the product. Id.
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latent, ill-effects of a product are manifested. 135 Thus, the notion of
statutes of repose violates the established tort principle of providing
remedies to innocent, injured plaintiffs, while holding tortfeasors culpable for their tortious conduct. To avoid this result, many states
with statutes of repose have excepted product claims which are based
on latent injuries appearing years after exposure, such as injuries
36
caused by asbestos.1

The EC statute of repose provision will likely deter the development of nontraditional approaches to causation because many products liability actions will be barred even before the product manifests
its harmful effects. This result is not as harsh as it would be if consumer protection were based solely on judicial remedies because of
137
European extrajudicial remedies.
D. Remedies Outside the Litigation Process
In Europe, there are numerous disincentives for plaintiffs who
wish to litigate products liability and other civil claims. Primarily,
the notion of pre-trial discovery, including document production,
depositions, and interrogatories, is unheard of in civil law nations and
severely limited even in common law nations like the United Kingdom. 138 Also, product accident and defect data is not as readily available in Europe as in the United States. 139 The lack of discovery
135. Felder, supra note 119, at 1543; AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:63. In addition, a
number of lawsuits have erupted challenging statutes of repose on both equal protection and
due process grounds for improperly denying plaintiffs access to the courts. See Thomas J.
Dennis, Note, Product Liability Statutes ofRepose as Conflicting with State Constitutions: The
Plaintiffs Are Winning, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 363, 363-76 (1984); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Terminating Right of Action for Product Caused Injury at
Fixed Period After Manufacture, Sale or Delivery, 25 A.L.R. 4TH 641, 641-56 (1983).
136. AM. LAW, supra note 3, § 47:63. For example, Indiana, Oregon, Nebraska, and Tennessee exempt asbestos claims from the statute of repose. Oregon also excepts cases based on
IUDs from its statute. Colorado and Connecticut exempt cases based on prolonged exposure
to hazardous substances, while Georgia and North Carolina exclude those product defects
which result in death or personal injury from diseases or birth defects. Id.
137. See supra note 2. See infra notes 146-48.
138. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 88-89; Liebman, supra note 94, at 813; Randolph J.
Stayin, The U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers,
14 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 193, 197 (1988). See generally Galen, supra note 1, at 60-66.; Lee White,
Trial Lawyers Face A New Charge, FORTUNE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 85-86, 88-89. The costs of
discovery normally compose approximately 80% of the legal costs of United States companies.
Galen, supra note 1, at 62.
139. Stayin, supra note 138, at 197. In the coming years, this situation may improve
through the implementation of a 1989 EC Product Safety Directive that mandates central
reporting and collection of product hazard and accident data. Bernstein, supra note 95, at 71112.
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opportunities and product information often makes it difficult for
plaintiffs to maintain products liability actions that normally require
detailed, technical product information and analysis.' 40
In addition, the absence of class action opportunities and contingency fee arrangements, common in United States products liability
actions, raises further obstacles. Unlike United States claimants,
those already bearing the civil litigation expenses face the added risk
of paying the legal fees of the victorious opponent under the EC.1 4 '
Even in successful civil suits, damage awards are generally much
lower in Europe than in the United States. This is because there is no
right to a civil jury trial and therefore judges, rather than more sympathetic juries, determine damage amounts. 142 Unlike the United
States, damage awards in European nations are typically limited to
compensatory damages for lost wages and medical expenses and not
punitive damages.1 43 Also, European courts place little value on nonmaterial damages such as pain and suffering.' 44
With the procedural and remedial barriers and limitations discussed above, European plaintiffs can turn to social programs to remedy their personal and economic injuries. In contrast to United States
citizens, Europeans can rely on a host of social programs in their own
nations including health coverage, disability payments, income maintenance, and other forms of social insurance. 145 In some nations,
140. Technical expertise and specialization in products liability so common in the United
States are underdeveloped in the EC and Japan, which complicates opportunities for successful
plaintiff outcomes in product liability actions. Stayin, supra note 138, at 196-97.
141. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 90; Liebman, supra note 94, at 809-11, 813; Stayin,
supra note 138, at 196.
142. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 89; Bernstein, supra note 95, at 692-93, 713; Stayin,
supra note 138, at 196; Liebman, supra note 94, at 811-12. Low damage awards may also be
traced to the less adversarial nature of civil hearings where judges call and question witnesses.
Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 89; Liebman, supra note 94, at 811-12. For example, a review
of jury damage awards in Ireland illustrates that such awards were four to six times higher
than damage awards determined by judges in England. Stayin, supra note 138, at 196.
143. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 89-90; Dielmann, supra note 90, at 1399; Stayin,
supra note 138, at 196. Some commentators suggest that United States juries are often
tempted to try to change or improve the life of injured plaintiffs. White, supra note 138, at 88.
Commenting on jury damage awards, Professor Lester Brickman of the Cardozo Law School
stated, "Some juries think it is their duty to transfer wealth from corporations to those lucky
enough to appear before them." Id. at 86.
144. Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 90; Liebman, supra note 94, at 810-11. See infra
notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
145. Bernstein, supra note 95, at 688-89; Thieffry et al., supra note 90, at 90. It has been
argued that the Directive's strict liability approach, by not requiring a showing of fault, seeks
to shift some of the burden of increased health costs to private companies and insurers and
away from state-administered health programs. Bernstein, supra note 95, at 689-90. But the
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manufacturers of certain products must contribute to compulsory tort
compensation programs that aid injured consumers, which produces a
fixed cost for industry producers without resorting to industry-wide
liability. 46 Europeans, unlike their United States counterparts, can
access these social programs and public compensation schemes to address the economic and physical effects of products liability injuries.
Therefore, they do not require the more expensive and restrictive
processes of litigation. 47 As one commentator noted,
EC countries do not use litigation for the instrumentalist or public
law function that prevails in the United States; lawsuits do not
achieve social goals .... Americans waged a consumerist revolution in products liability law of necessity, because they could not
bring themselves to require the regulation and social insurance
needed for consumer protection. 148
Disincentives to litigate and protective social programs reduce
plaintiffs' desire for and access to the courts for products liability recovery. Because there is less litigation, EC courts have fewer opportunities to review and analyze novel causation approaches to product
defects than do the United States' courts. Limited court review and
interpretation of products liability cases will likely prevent, or at least
greatly impede, future development of nontraditional defendant identification theories. However, the pervasive social safety net found in
European nations will help avoid remediless innocent plaintiffs, an
important policy basis for nontraditional causation theories in the
United States.
V.

CAUSE-IN-FACT PRINCIPLES AND JAPANESE APPROACHES TO
PRODUCT DEFECT ISSUES

A.

Overview of Japanese Law on Products Liability

Japan's civil code legal system blends Japanese tradition with
Directive is unlikely to change the fact that Europeans will continue to use the social health
and welfare programs rather than utilizing the limited course of litigation as their safety net as
found in the United States. Id. at 688-89, 714-15.
146. See generally John G. Fleming, DrugInjury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. COMP. L.
297 (1982) (comparing West German, Swedish, and Japanese approaches to socializing risks
for defective drug products). See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
147. Bernstein, supra note 95, at 688-89, 714-15.
148. Id. at 714-15. The commentator suggested that the Directive shifts the EC emphasis
toward litigation and away from social programs. Yet the commentator notes that, as the
national courts review and interpret the directive, the EC will continue their unified commitment to economic equality and care for the afflicted, unlike in the United States. Id. at 714-15.
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Western influences. 149 In this civil law system, the governmental bureaucracy wields significant authority while the judiciary maintains a
very limited role.150 Japanese civil law courts lack the breadth of equitable and interpretive powers found in common law courts. In Japan, the expanded legal liability flows primarily from legislative or
5
codical revisions.1 '

Under Japanese law, there is no specific products liability theory
governing product defect cases. Instead, liability is derived from piecing together various provisions of the Japanese Civil Code pertaining

to contractual and tort liability.15 2 Despite pressures from Japanese
consumers and attorney groups, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry ("MITI") and business groups have blocked efforts to
153
implement strict liability law in product defect cases.

The Japanese government claims such a law is premature and
cautions that rapid changes will disrupt a necessary balance between
consumer and business interests. 5 4 Asserting that current negligence
law is adequate to deal with product defect cases, the government
warns that imposing strict liability will lead to judicial system abuses
and consumer prices increases. 15
149.

Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System,

in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 73-74 (A. von Mehren ed.,

1963); Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, ProductLiability Law in Japan: An Introduction to a Developing Area of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L CoMP. L. 29, 32 (1984); Richard B. Parker,
Law, Language, and the Individualin Japanand the United States, 7 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 179, 202
(1988). Much of Japan's civil and criminal codes are patterned after German legal codes.
Tanabe, supra, at 73-74; Ottley & Ottley, supra, at 32 n.15., Parker, supra, at 202 n.41. Family
law matters often codify Japanese custom. Ottley & Ottley, supra, at 33 n.15. The Constitution of 1946 was heavily influenced by United States political philosophy, while Japanese labor
and antitrust statutes were modeled after United States federal statutes. Parker, supra, at 203
n.41.
150. Parker, supra note 149, at 202. See generally Tanabe, supra note 149 (discussing the
limited role and development of Japanese courts and legal profession).
151. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 59.
152. David Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, JapaneseProductSafety Regulation
and International Trade, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 315, 324-25 (1985); John 0. Haley, Law and
Society in ContemporaryJapan: American Perspectives;Introduction:Legal vs. Social Controls,
17 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 1-2 (1984); Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 42-55; Kijuro Arita,
ProductsLiability Law of Japan, in 3A PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 59.01-59.04 (L. Frumer & M.
Friedman eds., 1991).
153. Yoko Inoue, Consumers Pressfor More Protection;Efforts Stepped up to Enact a Japan Law on Products Liability, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUM (JAPANESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL),
Dec. 22, 1990, at 4; Ai Nakijima, Products Liability: How Tough a Law; Consumer Advocates
Pressfor Endorsement in Planned Interim Report to PrimeMinister, NIKKE! WKLY., Aug. 31,
1991, at 4.
154. See sources cited supra note 153.
155. See sources cited supra note 153. Critics of Japanese policies have stated that the
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Due to limitations under contract theory,1 56 most product defect
cases are brought under a negligence tort theory.1 57 Although negligence is a more accessible theory in Japan than contract, proving negligence is still extremely difficult due to litigation costs, procedural
obstacles and the difficulty in obtaining corporate records necessary to

evaluate complex product technology.
Under section 709 of the Civil Code, "a person who intentionally

or negligently violates another person's right must pay damages." 1 58
Similarly, under the theory of negligence, the manufacturer, non-

manufacturing seller, distributor, wholesaler, retailer, and other marketing outlets may be liable to the buyer or other third party injured
by the defective product, just as they would be in the United States.1 59
Japanese negligence theory places the burden of proof on the injured party to show that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached a duty of reasonable care, (3) the
defendant negligently sold or manufactured a defective product,
government's resistance to strict products liability stems from a desire to maintain an international competitive edge in product innovation and costs in light of European and United States
strict liability laws. Inoue, supra note 153, at 4. See Nakijima, supra note 153, at 4. Despite
government and business efforts to avoid strict liability, a recent survey indicated that about
80% of major Japanese corporations anticipate that a product liability law will be passed
within five years due largely to growing public opinion and international trade pressures.
ProductsLiability Law Looking More Likely; CorporateExecs Wary of Opposing Idea but Concerned about Content, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUM (JAPANESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL), April 20,
1991, at 15.
156. In Japan, contract theory under the Civil Code provides a much more restricted form
of the breach of warranty theory available in the United States. Arita, supra note 152,
§§ 59.01-02; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 332-34; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at
43-45. Under the theory of incomplete performance of contractual obligations (Civil Code
§ 415), liability is primarily limited to the buyer-seller relationship. The seller is only able to
escape liability if the defect was outside the seller's control. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.02(a);
Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 333; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 43. The second
theory of warranty for latent defects (Civil Code § 570) limits recovery largely to the cost of
the defective product, without the opportunity for personal injury, economic loss, or property
damages. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 332-3; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 4445.
157. Because of the limitations on contract theory, most products liability cases are
brought under the more flexible tort theory of negligence. Koichi Hamada et al., The Evolution and Consequences of Product Liability Rules, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 89 (Gary Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986); Cohen & Martin, supra
note 152, at 327-28; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 45.
158. General tort theory demands that the defendant negligently manufactured, and sold a
defective product, the plaintiff suffered harm, and the defective product caused the harm.
Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(a)(ii). Additional negligence requirements are then layered
over these elements. Id. § 59.03(2)(b)(ii).
159. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 31; Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(iii)(f), (g).
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(4) the plaintiff suffered an injury, and (5) the defendant's product
caused the injury.160 The plaintiff has the burden of proving causation by linking the defendant's acts or omissions to the plaintiff's injuries. 16 1 The Japanese approach to negligence reflects the burden of
proof found in the United States.
However, the Japanese Civil Code contains no article on causation and the Japanese courts have not fully recognized the distinct
nature of cause-in-fact, including defendant identification.1 62 Japanese courts have eased the burden of proof by allowing an inference of
negligence under the principle of res ipsa loquitur or through statistical or epidemiological evidence. 163 Findings of negligence based on
inferential information arise primarily from pollution cases in Japan. 164 Although this inferential approach could be applied to products liability cases, courts have not yet commonly relaxed the
165
plaintiff's burden of proof for causation.
In Japan, as in the United States, a defendant can be liable for
negligent design, manufacture, and warning.1 66 Manufacturers are
obligated to use the utmost care in producing reasonably safe products and give the highest regard to scientific investigation. The standard is equivalent to the state-of-the-art defense in the United
States. 167 Defendant manufacturers can be held jointly and severally
liable for their negligence. 16 As in the United States, plaintiffs must
bring their claim within three years from the date of their knowledge
160. Arita, supra note 152, §§ 59-03(2)(a),(b); Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 329.
161. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 91; Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(d)(i),(ii).
162. Seimei Hyashida, The Necessity for the RationalBasis of Duty-Risk Analysis in Japanese Tort Law: A Comparative Study, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 65, 72-73.
163. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 90-91; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 331;
Arita, supra note 152, § 59.04(2).
164. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 331.
In pollution cases, courts permit epidemiological and statistical proofs to counter the
problems caused by wealthy and uncooperative defendants, multiple injuries, and
elusive evidence of causation. In doing so, a plaintiff may recover by showing that a
defendant controls the source of pollution. These developments also allow a plaintiff
to establish proximate causation where the precise origin of the injury is unclear.
Id.
165. Id. In products liability cases, use of the inferential approach is limited to cases of
widespread harm. Id.
166. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 329; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 47-55;
Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(f.
167. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.04(6). It has been suggested that one can infer responsibility without fault based upon this required high degree of care. Id. This high standard of
care makes it easier to prove causation, particularly in food poisoning cases. Hamada et al.,
supra note 157, at 91-92.
168. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 48; Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(s)(i).

1993]

ComparativeProducts Liability

663

of the injury and the party causing the harm, allowing potential open-

ended liability. 169
Tortfeasors in Japan are responsible for all monetary damages
associated with the tortious conduct, 170 including damages for death,
personal injury, property damage, pain and suffering of the individual
and for close relatives in death cases (solatium), attorney's fees, and
interest. 171 This is similar to practice in the United States. Although
Japan does not recognize contributory negligence, it does apply the
concept of comparative negligence.172
Clearly, the main requirements of United States and Japanese
negligence theories used in product defect cases are similar. But the
similarities to United States legal theory do not ensure similar legal
developments or judicial interpretations in the future. It is difficult to
predict whether Japan will develop nontraditional cause-in-fact theories similar to those in the United States. Unlike the EC, there is no
central directive or statutory authority for Japanese products liability
law. Yet a review of Japanese legal traditions, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, governmental liability, enforcement issues, and
public compensation schemes support the notion that Japanese courts
are unlikely to develop such nontraditional cause-in-fact approaches.
B.

Alternative Dispute Resolution and Barriers to Litigation

In Japan, only 150 cases have received court review and final
determination since 1945.173 In Japan, the number of civil suits per
capita is approximately four to ten percent that of many Western nations. 174 Until the 1960s, products liability cases in Japan were virtu-

ally nonexistent. 175
Many commentators have discussed the nonlitigious nature of
Japanese society, often attributing it to either cultural concerns for
social harmony and respect for authority, 7 6 or a lack of legal con169. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(q)(iii).
170. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 103; Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(q)(i).
171. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(q)(ii).
172. Id. § 59.03(2)(r).
173. Nakijima, supra note 153, at 4.
174. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 325 n.46.
175. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 103; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 326.
176. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in ContemporaryJapan, in LAW INJAPAN
41, 43-45 (A. von Mehren ed., 1963); Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 326; Ottley &
Ottley, supra note 149, at 33-34; Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in JapaneseSociety: Comparisons with the West, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (1985).

664

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 15:629

sciousness and notions of individual rights. 177 Commentators also
point to societal mistrust of the courts and lawyers because judicial
decisions emphasize conflict, assign moral fault, and deprive parties of
participation in the resolution of the dispute. 178 Yet attitudes are
changing, as more Japanese are now willing to sue in cases that have a
good chance of success. An example is mass tort products liability
cases involving community, rather than just individual interests. 79
The scarcity of lawsuits, including products liability litigation,
may be traced to well-developed extrajudicial and quasi-judicial methods of dispute resolution. Such alternatives are only beginning to receive attention in the United States. 180 In Japan, there are three
principal forms of alternative dispute resolution: reconcilement, con18
ciliation, and chotei. 1

Traditional reconcilement involves negotiation sessions between
the affected parties in an effort to reach a resolution within the nature
and needs of the relationship.18 2 Reconcilement relies heavily on the
status of the social groups involved in the dispute and does not adhere
to any particular legal rules. The more powerful party (oyabun)

within the relationship is supposed to exercise power in the best interests of the less powerful party (kobun). Typically, the decision of the
superior is more or less imposed on the party with lower social status,
which can lead to unfairness. 83
177. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 43-45. Commentators often discuss the work of Professor Kawashima about the sociological reasons for the nonlitigious nature of Japanese society, utilizing the concepts of law consciousness (ho-ishiki) and right consciousness (kenriishiki). Professor Kawashima's approach emphasizes the Japanese distaste for rigid codes of
law and focuses on social duties and relationships, rather than legal rights, as limiting litigation. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 150, at 34-35; Tanaka, supra note 176, at 379-80. But see
Tanaka, supra note 176, at 381-86 (disputing sociological basis for nonlitigious nature of Japanese society).
178. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 43-45, 50; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 35-36;
Tanaka, supra note 176, at 378-79.
179. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 326-27; Tanaka, supra note 176, at 381, 384. The
major mass tort cases focused on the widespread injuries resulting from the thalidomide,
chloroquine, and tainted food cases. See Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 89-90; Ottley &
Ottley, supra note 149, at 47-55 (discussing major mass tort cases). Very little attention or
assistance is provided to isolated plaintiffs trying to uphold individual rights in civil matters.
Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 327.
180. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 325-26; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 35-38;
Tanaka, supra note 176, at 384-86.
181. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50-51, 53-54; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 3538.
182. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 36.
183. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50; Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Processof
Informal Dispute Resolution in Japan: Traditionaland Modern Aspects with Special Emphasis
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Conciliation is the second informal method of dispute resolution.
84
It is a modified form of reconcilement employing an intermediary.
Although not differentiated in traditional Japan, conciliation has two
main forms that are similar to mediation and arbitration found in the
United States. While mediation is not binding, it often leads to settlement. Similar to arbitration, this method allows the third party to
make a binding decision.185 The intermediary determines whether the
conciliation takes the form of mediation or arbitration. 86 Typically,
conciliation is used in local domestic, neighborhood, and employment
disputes, 87 and is not well-suited to cases outside of such social relationships. Products liability claims, for instance, would not be well
suited to be resolved by conciliation.
After the post-World War I breakdown of traditional social relationships, a new dispute resolution process called chotei was implemented. 88 Chotei involves a hearing conducted by a committee,
89
which is composed of a judge and two or more lay conciliators.
This approach may be invoked by the parties or a judge prior to filing
a claim or at any time during the trial. The chotei committee attempts
to forge a compromise between the parties which will be put in writing and filed in court as a final judgment. If no compromise is
reached, the chotei committee may present opinions to the court
which may then issue a final decision. 90
Although these options allow parties to participate in the outcome of the controversy, these forms of dispute resolution are informal and normally closed to the public.' 9' Their private, informal
nature prevents the collection of product defect information, vital to
other injured consumers considering litigation and to increasing public awareness of product risks. In most negligence actions, proof of
fault becomes virtually impossible without access to the vital technical
on In-Court Compromise, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 74, 88-89 (1987); Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149,
at 36-37.
184. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50-51; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 36-37.
185. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50-51; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 36-37.
186. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 50-51. The Japanese Civil Code explicitly allows formal arbitration, particularly in labor-management disputes, but it is seldom invoked. Id. at 56.
187. Id. at 53; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 37.
188. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 51-53.
189. Id. at 54; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 37.
190. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 37-38. Parties are entitled to challenge the final
determination within two weeks, otherwise the decision is final. Id. at 38. In some instances,
when parties are unable to reach a compromise, the chotei committee may be terminated and
the situation may move through the litigation process. Id.
191. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 38; Obuchi, supra note 183, at 88-89.
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information gleaned from other product defect cases. 192
In addition, well-established barriers to litigation within the
court system often motivate injured consumers to pursue extrajudicial
avenues of dispute resolution. Before bringing a civil case, plaintiffs
must pay an initial "commencing fee" of up to eight percent of the
damages sought as well as attorneys' fees and court costs. 193 Similar
to the EC, there is no pretrial discovery process in Japan, which pre194
cludes plaintiff review of relevant company records prior to trial.
Government agencies further restrict public access by not maintaining
formal records on product defect and accident information. 95 Without the precedures for class action lawsuits and contingency fee arrangements, opportunities for sharing product information and legal
96
costs among similarly injured plaintiffs are additionally restricted.
Furthermore, trial judges allow intervals of days, or sometimes
months, between the days of the trial, hoping to encourage a private
settlement. 197 Those who are able to weather these procedural obstacles and delays find, as in the EC, that damage awards are much
lower than in the United States. This is because judges set the awards
instead of juries, and opportunities for pain and suffering and punitive
192. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 330-31; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at
39; Stayin, supra note 138, at 197. As one commentator notes:
Even where injuries are relatively numerous, a potential plaintiff may not be aware
of, or have access to, relevant evidence regarding the frequency or incidence of injury
to others who have chosen not to litigate. This problem will be exacerbated to the
extent that individual Japanese plaintiffs choose not to single themselves out and take
the initiative to litigate or to join plaintiff litigation associations as in the case of mass
torts.
Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 331.
In addition, most lawsuits are settled without court decisions in Japan, with settlements
viewed as secret corporate records. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 55; Nakijima, supra
note 153, at 4.
193. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 103; Tanabe, supra note 149, at 79; Galen, supra
note 1, at 64-65.
194. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 339-434; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 39;
Stayin, supra note 138, at 197; Galen, supra note 1, at 64-65. Generally, "victims face considerable obstacles. Not only will they be ignorant of the relevant technology, they may not have
the resources or tools to pierce the veil of industrial secrecy surrounding many commercial and
industrial enterprises in the absence of a discovery process." Cohen & Martin, supra note 152,
at 330.
195. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 330-31; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 39;
Stayin, supra note 138, at 197.
196. Cohen, supra note 152, at 340; Stayin, supra note 138, at 196; Galen, supra note 1, at
65.
197. Kawashima, supra note 176, at 48; Tanabe, supra note 149, at 106; Ottley & Ottley,
supra note 149, at 38-39, 55; Harold See, The Judiciaryand Dispute Resolution in Japan, 10
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 360-61 (1982).
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damages are limited. 98 These limitations are likely to force injured
consumers to seek alternative dispute resolution, often without the
benefit of sharing important technical data or legal costs with other
similarly injured plaintiffs.
These obstacles to litigation, coupled with the availability of private, informal dispute resolution, hinder judicial interpretation and
application of positive law. 199 Often, litigation increases public awareness and social pressure for products liability reform.2°° By limiting
litigation and encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, Japanese courts have few meaningful opportunities for
detailed legal analysis of causation or for more expansive interpretations of cause-in-fact theories, 20 1 as found in the United States. With
such restricted court review and interpretation of negligence products
liability matters, the development of expansive, nontraditional causein-fact theories in Japan is unlikely in the near future.
C.

Reliance on Governmental Protection of the Consumer

In Japan, there is a growing body of administrative regulations
aimed at preventing product hazards from ever reaching the marketplace. 20 2 The powerful Japanese government bureaucracy, in cooperation with major business groups, has established rigorous product
safety standards, including requirements for detailed design specifications and strict certification procedures. 203 In addition, governmental
agencies use "administrative guidance" (gyosei shido) to maintain
both formal and informal control over corporations in Japan. 2°4
198. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 39-40; Stayin, supra note 138, at 196; Galen, supra
note 1, at 64-65. For example, in the United States, the state court average damage award for
product liability cases was $1.5 million per case. Galen, supra note 1, at 64. In February 1992,
a chemical poisoning case involving 42 victims resulted in a total court award of $1.3 million
or only $31,000 per victim. Id.
199. Obuchi, supra note 183, at 89.
200. Id.
201. Id.; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 56; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 327.
202. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 365-67; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 4041; Arita, supra note 152, §§ 59.02(2)(b), 59.03(2)(c)(i).
203. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 365-67.
204. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 103-04; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 39.
Through unofficial suggestions, the Japanese government is able to secure the voluntary cooperation of businesses who may be subject to a range of sanctions for failing to comply. These
unofficial activities tend to provide little documentation on corporate wrongdoing, which, in
turn, benefits business but hurts injured plaintiffs. See generally John 0. Haley, Administrative
Guidance versus Formal Regulation, Resolving the Paradox of IndustrialPolicy, in LAW AND
TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds., 1986)
(discussing notion of administrative guidance in Japan).
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Government resolve to promulgate even more demanding product regulations hardened when several serious products liability cases
occurred involving widespread harm in Japan. 20 5 Japanese administrative agencies license or certify products to be marketed and are
responsible for proper supervision of the design and manufacturing
activities of the industries they regulate. 2° 6 The Japanese government
has resisted pressures to soften their compliance mandates, stating:
The United States has been requesting that the Japanese Government allow United States manufacturers to self-certify compliance
with Japanese standards on safety, etc. This suggests that we
should adopt the approach of dealing with accidents, etc., after the
fact, i.e., through recall of cars from the market, civil judicial procedures, etc. However, Japan's system on automobile accidents,
pollution, etc. has long been predicated on the idea that they
20 7
should be prevented before the fact.
Unlike United States law, Japanese regulatory law relies heavily
on government action to protect consumers rather than encouraging
private litigation to enforce laws that protect the public. 208 The government stop all sales of an allegedly hazardous product until the
manufacturer can provide evidence of its safety. 2° 9 In addition, the
Civil Code expressly grants the government the authority to prosecute
individual corporate officers for criminal negligence for injuries or
death caused by a defective product. 210
205. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 366-67.
206. Id. at 328; see Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 47-55 (discussing negligence liability of the Ministry of Health and Welfare).
207. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 367 n.247 (quoting MrrI, REVIEW OF STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS 7 (1983)).
208. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 366-68; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 40.
One commentator has noted that "Japanese judges have not and could not challenge the ruling
governmental bureaucracy in Japan in any significant way ....
Also working against the
authority of law in Japan is the bureaucracy's resistance to the loss of prestige and power
which a legalization or politicization of its role would bring about." Parker, supra note 149, at
202 (footnotes omitted).
209. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 41.
210. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 334-35; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 4142. The best known criminal prosecution involved the Morinaga Dairy case in which two
company officials were charged with accidental homicide for tainted milk that killed more than
100 children. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 89-90; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 42.
At the end of a long trial, the defendants were acquitted at the district court level because they
could not have known of a variation of the quality of the chemicals used in the milk. Hamada
et al., supra note 157, at 89; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 42. On appeal, a retrial was
ordered against only one defendant, the manufacturing chief, for failure to properly inspect the
milk in accordance with requirements of the food trade. Hamada et al., supra note 157, at 90.
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Unlike consumers in the United States, Japanese consumers frequently rely on government administrative agencies, rather than the
courts, to protect them from defective products. 2 11 By promoting
product safety under the Civil Code, rather than products liability,
Japanese courts lack the authority and opportunity to fashion creative
approaches to product defect cases such as nontraditional cause-infact theories. 2 12 Because of the major role of Japanese regulatory
agencies in product design, manufacture and marketing, injured Japanese consumers, unlike their United States counterparts, are unlikely
to find themselves without a remedy if they are unable to identify the
actual manufacturer of a product. Additionally, while United States
courts have reshaped cause-in-fact theories to provide remedies for
injured plaintiffs, Japanese laws allow injured plaintiffs to sue the government for compensation, as opposed to expanding causation to industry-wide liability.
Unlike the United States, the Japanese system does not recognize
the notion of sovereign immunity and allows an injured party to sue
the appropriate government ministry for breaching its duty to protect
the public from a defective product. 21 3 The Japanese government has
been sued for negligence in defective design, manufacture, and warning cases for their failure to properly supervise the offending product
or industry. 21 4 Japanese law adds the government as another potential defendant who injured plaintiffs may sue for compensation in
product defect cases to address cause-in-fact issues. 21 5
The S.M.O.N. case dealt with pharmaceuticals containing the
drug clioquinol which caused viruses of the nervous system. The Kanazawa District court handed down the first decision against the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The court decision found both the drug
manufacturers and the government ministry liable to the injured
plaintiffs. 21 6 The ratio of negligence was forty percent for the govern211. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 366-67; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 4042.
212. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 367; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 56;
Parker, supra note 149, at 202.
213. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 48; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 328-29.
Article 17 of the Constitution of Japan states, "Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the States or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through an
illegal act of any public official. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.(4)(a), (b). The government's
liability is codified under the State Compensation Law. Id.
214. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 47-55.
215. Id. at 48-50.
216. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 53; Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(s)(i).

670

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 15:629

ment, for breaching its duty to confirm the safety of the drugs, and
sixty percent for the three drug companies. 21 7 Despite a number of
findings against the plaintiffs in other districts, the drug companies
8
and Ministry ultimately settled the cases with remaining plaintiffs.21
In addition, the Japanese government has implemented a number
of compulsory public insurance programs and requires the establishment of compensation trust funds that shift the focus away from identifying specific defendants to ensuring the compensation of injured
consumers for certain defective products. Under these schemes, injured consumers are required to identify the defective product, rather
than the source of the product. 21 9 Similar to the EC safety net of
social programs, these Japanese government-mandated insurance programs and trust funds provide consumers with alternative remedies
without creating nontraditional causation approaches, as found in the
United States. Like the EC, Japan operates outside the litigation process to effectively deal with the protection of injured consumers in
product defect matters.
Japanese public insurance programs ensure compensation for
consumers injured by certain defective products. Based on the payment of insurance premiums, the risk of loss spreads among industry
participants, employers, and the Japanese government, ultimately
reaching Japanese consumers and taxpayers. Consumers are provided
with a remedy, while insurance fund contributors face a fixed insur220
ance premium cost, rather than unknown future damage awards.
Aside from public insurance programs, compensation trust funds
are common in Japan. 22 1 Under Japanese law, certain manufacturers
associations exact mandatory contributions from manufacturers of
particular products, such as pharmaceutical or consumer products
manufacturers. Contributions to these compensation funds may be
based upon the proportion of sales and the risk rate of each manufac217. Arita, supra note 152, § 59.03(2)(s)(i).
218. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 52-53. See Seiichi Yoshikawa, The Judge's Power
to Propose Termsfor Settlement: The S.M.O.N. Case, 11 LAW IN JAPAN 74-90 (1978) (discussing history and settlement of S.M.O.N. cases, including government and corporate
responsibility).
219. Fleming, supra note 146, at 309-10. European compensation plans require the injured consumers to identify the responsible producer, while the Japanese fund models require
only the identification of the defective product. Id.
220. Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 335-36.
221. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 53 n.124; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 33637.
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turer or funded through mandatory safety stickers on products. 2 22
The association determines the compensation to be awarded the injured consumer based on a fixed schedule, with the maximum benefit
223
usually totalling to less than tort damage awards.
For example, after the S.M.O.N. cases, the Japanese government
passed legislation to secure compensation for victims of mass drug
injuries. The pharmaceutical trust fund required contributions from
domestic manufacturers and drug importers as well as the government. The trust fund contained a set schedule of benefits for medical
expenses, disability allowances, disability care and death benefits. Recovery from the fund does not require a showing of fault, but does
provide a lower level of monetary compensation than tort litigation.
In fact, if the manufacturer can be proven negligent, the injured parties must pursue their tort remedies. 224 Therefore, plaintiffs who can
identify the manufacturer of the defective product can litigate their
claims, while those unable to identify the wrongdoer are assured of
some level of compensation without requiring courts to create nontraditional cause-in-fact approaches.
In Japan, the public's reliance on the government to protect consumers from unsafe products is based upon the imposition of tough
governmental product standards, with the administrative authority to
police full compliance. When the Japanese government fails to prevent a hazardous product from reaching the public, consumers may
sue the government or seek compensation outside the litigation process from government-mandated insurance and compensation funds.
These governmental approaches to product safety and liability
weaken the authority of the judiciary to explore causation theories
and resolve products liability cause-in-fact issues. As in the EC, the
Japanese courts are unlikely to be called upon to fashion novel causein-fact theories because other alternative remedies are already available to injured Japanese consumers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The EC and Japan are not predisposed to confront product defect matters through the courts, so it is unlikely that either will develop nontraditional approaches to causation. The United States has
222.
223.
37.
224.

Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 336-37.
Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 53 n. 124; Cohen & Martin, supra note 152, at 336Fleming, supra note 146, at 304; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 149, at 53 n.124.
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imposed the responsibility to protect consumers and to police manufacturers on the courts in product defect cases. This focus on the
courts to protect injured plaintiffs and to deter tortfeasors has led to
inconsistency and confusion over the application of cause-in-fact principles. Greater predictability and consistency in causation approaches to products liability may be possible in the United States
through the implementation of some of the extrajudicial mechanisms
found in the EC and Japan.
One option that may preserve traditional causation theories,
while protecting consumers and deterring liable manufacturers, is to
consider uniform defendant identification clauses, as found in the EC
Directive. At all levels in the distribution chain, product suppliers
could be responsible for identifying the producer of a product to the
injured consumer, or else be viewed as the producer. To protect
themselves from liability, suppliers would maintain adequate records.
In exchange for this responsibility, a reasonable statute of repose
could be enacted to protect producers from unending liability. The
possible harsh results of such a statute could be ameliorated by appropriate safety net programs to meet the basic health and economic
needs of injured consumers, such as national health care coverage.
Another option is to implement compulsory public insurance
programs or trust funds for products liability cases, like those employed in Japan. These programs might target certain high-risk products that have often resulted in creative approaches to traditional
causation, such as pharmaceuticals or hazardous chemicals. Such
public insurance or trust programs could be funded through contributions from applicable manufacturers and importers. Contributions
could be based upon the proportion of sales and the risk rate of each
manufacturer. Injured consumers would not have to identify a specific manufacturer, only the particular defective product. Plaintiffs
would be assured some level of compensation for injuries based upon
a set schedule of benefits, while contributors would pay a fixed, predictable amount.
Regardless of the model considered, either approach could be
supplemented by more active government regulation and certification
of products. Rather than relying on expansive court interpretations
of products liability law, the government could strive to protect the
public from injury and deter irresponsible manufacturers through
more stringent, enforced safety standards. Furthermore, corporate
willingness to move from a products liability to a product safety per-
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spective would help prevent defective products from ever reaching the
marketplace.
The time has come for a more creative, extrajudicial approach to
product defect concerns. Unless the United States turns its focus
away from the courts and seeks extrajudicial remedies, unpredictable
and inconsistent approaches to products liability concepts, including
cause-in-fact, will continue.

